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Access to 
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Participation in 
Clinical Trials 
Ruqaiijah A. Yearby
“ Governments exist to protect the rights of 
minorities. The loved and the rich need no 
protection: they have many friends and few 
enemies.” 
— Wendell Phillips
“ Vulnerability manifests an asymmetrical imbal-
ance between the weak and the powerful and in 
this context [bioethics] it demands an ethical 
engagement and that the powerful protect the 
weak.” 
 — Jacob Rendtorff
I. Background
Although the controversy over the lack of consent 
in fetal-tissue clinical trials is relatively new, history 
is replete with instances of medical researchers who 
have conducted clinical trials with minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged without their consent.1 
Traditionally, American bioethics has served as a 
safety net for the rich and powerful (for they are not 
forced to act as research subjects to obtain access to 
health care for themselves or their children) while fail-
ing to protect the vulnerable, which includes minori-
ties and the economically disadvantaged. Without 
access to health care, minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged are unduly influenced to participate in 
clinical trials that promise access to health care.
For example, researchers at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity hospital unduly influenced economically dis-
advantaged Baltimore parents into enrolling their 
children into a research study to prove criminality by 
lying about the purpose of the study and promising 
them access to free health care otherwise denied by 
Hopkins.2 The researchers enrolled more than 7,000 
boys, 95% of who came from poor African American 
families, into a study to determine whether having an 
extra “Y” chromosome increased criminality, but they 
told the parents that the study was to test for anemia 
and other medical problems. The study did not show 
a positive association between the extra “Y” chromo-
some and criminality or violence in the boys studied, 
yet the blood samples linked to names were given to 
the police.3 The researchers not only failed to get con-
sent from the parents because they lied about the pur-
pose of the research, but they also unduly influenced 
the parents into participating in the study by offering 
them access to health care that was usually withheld, 
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and both actions were a violation of the bioethical 
principle of “respect for persons.”
The “respect for persons” principle requires that 
“individuals be treated as autonomous agents” by 
obtaining their informed consent before they par-
ticipate in clinical trials.4 In order for the consent to 
be valid, it must be free of undue influence, which 
includes inducements such as promises of access to 
health care. Promises of access to health care invali-
date the voluntariness of consent because it leaves 
potential research subjects without choice, especially 
when the very institutions that are denying minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged access to health 
care are conducting the clinical trial. Without any 
meaningful choice to access health care other than 
participation in clinical trials, minorities and the eco-
nomically disadvantaged are induced into consenting. 
Thus, according to Professor Patricia King, instead 
of serving as a means of protection, bioethical princi-
ples, such as “respect for persons,” are used to promote 
“scientific and medical advances without recogniz-
ing that these developments occur in a social context 
that must be taken into account if the ethical issues 
are to be adequately addressed.”5 Specifically, when 
applying the “respect for persons” principle, research-
ers and regulators often fail to take into consideration 
the class and racial biases that prevent minorities and 
the economically disadvantaged from attaining equal 
access to economic opportunities. Without equal 
access to these opportunities, minorities and the eco-
nomically disadvantaged are prevented from access-
ing health care because of structural and institutional 
biases within the health care system.
As a result of structural bias, health care services in 
the United States are delivered based on ability to pay, 
leaving those who cannot pay (predominately minori-
ties and the economically disadvantaged) without 
access to health care. Institutional biases result in the 
accumulation of health care facilities and physicians in 
wealthy, Caucasian neighborhoods that do not accept 
government health insurance, such as Medicare and 
Medicaid,6 and lawsuits for payment by hospitals, 
leaving those who are a minority and economically 
disadvantaged with little to no access to health care. 
Burdened by disease and denied care from health care 
institutions, even in emergency situations, minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged are induced into 
participating in clinical trials to gain access to health 
care. 
In this paper, I will discuss how race and class biases 
are central to the bioethical debate about informed 
consent, why these biases prevent 
access to health care, and thus, must be 
addressed to ensure that research sub-
jects are not being unduly influenced 
into participating in clinical trials to 
attain access to health care. To measure 
whether consent is voluntary, federal 
agencies such as the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
should require researchers to use the 
Vulnerability and Equity Impact Assess-
ment tool, which I have created based on 
the Health Equity Impact Assessment 
tool, to determine whether minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged are 
being unduly influenced into participating in clinical 
trials in violation of the “respect for persons” principle.
II. Respect for Persons: Voluntary Informed 
Consent Required 
Created with the drafting of the Belmont Report in 
1979, current American bioethical principles are sup-
posed to protect the rights and health of research 
subjects while participating in clinical trials.7 One of 
the main bioethical principles in the Belmont Report, 
the “respect for persons” principle requires research 
subjects to be informed about the potential risks and 
burdens of participating in clinical trials before con-
senting to participation. This principle was created in 
response to abuses of the economically disadvantaged, 
minorities, children, and prisoners. One of the main 
impetuses for the creation of protections for the eco-
nomically disadvantaged and minorities participating 
in clinical trials was the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.
From 1932 until 1972, researchers enrolled eco-
nomically disadvantaged African American men who 
lacked access to health care in a clinical trial to docu-
ment the course of syphilis, even though the course of 
the disease was already known. In exchange for free 
meals, access to health care, and burial insurance, the 
In this paper, I will discuss how race and 
class biases are central to the bioethical 
debate about informed consent, why these 
biases prevent access to health care, and thus, 
must be addressed to ensure that research 
subjects are not being unduly influenced into 
participating in clinical trials to attain access 
to health care.
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researchers promised the men that they would provide 
treatment for their “bad blood,” a nebulous complaint 
that could include “anemic blood to muscle aches, 
general malaise, disorders such as parasitic infections, 
gonorrhea, syphilis, and other venereal disease.”8 The 
researchers never informed the men that they were 
participating in a clinical trial, and therefore, never 
told them about the purpose of the trial. Research-
ers also intentionally deprived these men of “demon-
strably effective treatment in order not to interrupt 
the project, long after such treatment became gener-
ally available,” causing the unnecessary disability and 
death of the men, their wives, and their children. The 
trial was not only unnecessary because researchers 
already knew the course of the disease and its effects, 
but it was also dangerous because researchers withheld 
information and treatment, which allowed syphilis to 
spread to the men’s wives and children. Thus, there 
was nothing gained from the trial other than exploit-
ing the economically disadvantaged and minorities.
To put an end to the exploitation of the economically 
disadvantaged and minorities, the Belmont Report 
incorporated informed consent into the “respect for 
persons” principle. Under this principle, researchers 
must respect the wishes of persons who are autono-
mous and capable of self-deliberation. To respect 
their autonomy, researchers must “give weight to the 
autonomous persons’ considered opinions and choices 
while refraining from obstructing their wishes unless 
they are clearly detrimental to others.”9 This respect 
of autonomy is fulfilled when researchers inform all 
research subjects about the risk of participation in the 
clinical trial and obtain the subjects’ voluntary con-
sent to participate. In order to be voluntary, the deci-
sion to participate in the clinical trial must be free of 
undue influence. Undue influence “occurs through an 
offer of an excessive, unwarranted, inappropriate or 
improper reward or other overture in order to obtain 
compliance,” and includes “action(s) such as manipu-
lating a persons’ choice by threatening to withdraw 
health services to which an individual would other-
wise be entitled.”10 According to British philosopher 
Onora O’Neil, the main purpose of informed con-
sent is to ensure that a research subject has not been 
unduly influenced into participating in clinical trials.11
In 1986, the Belmont Report in its entirety, was 
adopted by sixteen federal agencies and departments, 
including HHS, and codified in 45 C.F.R Part 46 (the 
Common Rule). To fulfill the requirements of the 
“respect for persons” principle, the Common Rule 
mandates that researchers draft and have all research 
subjects sign a consent form, which includes, “A state-
ment that participation is voluntary, refusal to par-
ticipate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the sub-
ject may discontinue participation at any time with-
out penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is 
otherwise entitled.”12 Institutions receiving federal 
funding to conduct clinical trials must enter into a 
contractual agreement with the federal government, 
called an assurance,13 asserting that they will com-
ply with the Common Rule requirements, such as 
informed consent. Once an institution’s assurance is 
approved and it receives federal funding, the federal 
government requires that all research conducted by 
the institution regardless of who funds it comply with 
45 C.F.R Part 46. Hence, the Common Rule governs 
nearly all research studies conducted by or funded by 
the federal government, except for studies conducted 
in emergency settings.14 
The Office for Human Research Protections 
(OHRP), a federal agency within HHS, is respon-
sible for ensuring that institutions comply with their 
assurances and the Common Rule.15 To fulfill this task, 
OHRP conducts site visits. These visits can be ran-
dom or in response to allegations of noncompliance 
with the Common Rule.16 When reviewing allega-
tions of noncompliance, OHRP grants the institution 
an opportunity to refute the allegations. Once addi-
tional information is obtained, OHRP determines 
whether the institution has violated the law. OHRP 
issues corrective action for instances of noncompli-
ance, which is in “the best interest of human research 
subjects, and to the extent possible, the institution, the 
research community, and HHS.”17 Corrective action 
may include restriction or withdrawal of approval for 
an institution’s assurance and suspension or perma-
nent removal from participation in specific projects.18 
Information regarding allegations and findings of 
noncompliance can be found on OHRP’s website.
OHRP is responsible for reviewing compliance at 
the institutional level. Every institution that has an 
assurance is responsible for ensuring that individual 
clinical trials conducted by those affiliated with the 
institution comply with the Common Rule. To accom-
plish this task, all institutions and federal agencies that 
enter into an assurance have an Institutional Review 
Board (IRB). Before researchers can conduct clinical 
trials using human subjects in the United States or be 
funded by the United States government to conduct 
clinical trials using human subjects, they must submit 
a research protocol to their IRB.19 A complete research 
protocol includes a statement of compliance with the 
ethical principles, such as the “respect for persons” 
principle.20 The IRB reviews all written research pro-
tocols in application for clinical trials using human 
subjects to ensure that the proposed studies are ethi-
cal. If the IRB finds that the research protocol is ethi-
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cal, they can approve the research to be conducted 
and/or submitted for funding to the United States 
government. The IRB can also require modifications 
in the research protocol or disapprove any research 
protocol.21
In terms of the “respect for persons” principle, the 
IRB is required to ensure that all consent forms for 
participation in clinical trials include “a statement that 
participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will 
involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the sub-
ject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discon-
tinue participation at any time without penalty or loss 
of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled.”22 
Thus, in accordance with the Common Rule, the IRB 
is required to ensure that no researcher uses research 
subjects who have not voluntarily consented to partic-
ipation in the clinical trial. If the IRB allows subjects to 
participate involuntarily, the institution is in violation 
of their assurance and subject to corrective action by 
OHRP. Not only does the “respect for persons” prin-
ciple apply to research conducted in the United States 
or funded by the United States government, but it also 
governs research used to seek drug approval by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
In addition to the Common Rule, OHRP issued a 
non-binding guidance to assist IRBs in fulfilling their 
responsibilities in protecting the rights and welfare 
of human subjects. Among other things, the Guide-
book focuses on the need for protecting vulnerable 
populations, such as minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged, from undue influence that negates 
voluntary consent. Specifically, the Guidebook notes 
that researchers need to be aware that consent is not 
voluntary when there is real or perceived belief that 
participation is necessary to receive continuing care 
from health professionals or because the receipt of any 
treatment is perceived as preferable to receiving no 
treatment.23 Thus, seemingly, the lack of meaningful 
choice when it comes to accessing health care makes 
consent involuntary. 
Notwithstanding the requirements of the Belmont 
Report, the Common Rule, and the Guidebook, minor-
ities and the economically disadvantaged continue to 
be unduly influenced into participating in clinical tri-
als in violation of the “respect for persons” principle. 
Although, the “respect for persons” principle standard 
is a significant protection when health care is acces-
sible, it has little direct application when health care 
access is scarce and medical resources are very lim-
ited. For example, the researchers in the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study clearly failed to obtain informed con-
sent by lying to the men about the study. However, 
even if the researchers had not lied about the study, 
the informed consent would not have been voluntary 
during the first 32 years of the study. During this time, 
the U.S. government (state and federal) mandated and 
funded racially separate and unequal health care facil-
ities, often barring African Americans from access-
ing health care. By offering access to health care to 
research subjects, the researchers were inducing them 
to participate in the clinical trial because that was the 
main way African Americans could obtain access to 
health care. Hence, the African Americans’ consent 
was not voluntary. Minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged still face significant barriers to access-
ing health care because of class and racial biases, even 
after the passage of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (ACA). 
III. Social Context: Class and Racial Biases
In the United States, class and racial biases, actions 
based on negative pre-judgment against a person or 
group based on socioeconomic status or race, persist. 
These biases predict differential access to resources 
such as income and wealth. Often relegated to impov-
erished and racially segregated neighborhoods, 
minorities and the economically disadvantaged attend 
low-quality schools, keeping them unemployed, 
underemployed, or in jobs without health insurance. 
Without these resources, minorities and the economi-
By offering access to health care to research subjects, the researchers  
were inducing them to participate in the clinical trial because that was  
the main way African Americans could obtain access to health care.  
Hence, the African Americans’ consent was not voluntary. Minorities and  
the economically disadvantaged still face significant barriers to accessing 
health care because of class and racial biases, even after the passage  
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
contemporary challenges in informed consent • fall 2016 449
Ruqaiijah A. Yearby
cally disadvantaged are prevented from accessing 
health care.24 
Among other categories, income and wealth 
inequalities are used to measure class and racial biases. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2014 report, 
the top 5% of households receive about 21.8% of the 
income, while the bottom 60% received 27.8% of the 
income.25 Furthermore, the richest 20% of U.S. fami-
lies accounted for 88.9% of all wealth in the United 
States and the highest earning 20% of U.S. families 
earned 61.8% of all income in the United States.26 In 
fact, in 2013, the median wealth of U.S. upper income 
families was $639,400 compared to $96,500 for 
middle-income families, and $9,100 for low-income 
families, the widest gap in 30 years.27 When you add 
in the race factor, economically disadvantaged minor-
ities are more likely to live in neighborhoods with a 
high degree of poverty compared to economically dis-
advantaged Caucasians.28 By 2008, over half of His-
panics, African Americans, and American Indians and 
Alaska Natives were economically disadvantaged or 
near economically disadvantaged compared with 27% 
of Caucasians and 31% of Asians.29 
Minorities have higher poverty rates that Cauca-
sians because racial bias prevents them from obtain-
ing the same employment opportunities as Cauca-
sians, limiting their ability to earn income and build 
wealth. Research also shows that in several industries 
minorities are paid less than Caucasians doing equal 
work. For example, minorities, such as African Ameri-
cans and Hispanics, are often not hired by most of the 
well-known high-tech firms; however, when they are 
hired they receive less pay and are passed over for pro-
motions and pay raises. Hispanics make $16,353 less, 
Asians make $8,146 less, and African Americans make 
$3,656 less than Caucasians working in the high-tech 
industry.30 This disparity in earnings affects wealth, 
leading to racial gaps.
Following the same households for over 25 years 
(1984-2009), researchers found that the total wealth 
gap between Caucasian and African American fami-
lies nearly tripled, increasing from $85,000 in 1984 
to $236,500 in 2009, a difference of $152,000.31 The 
study also showed that in 2009 the median wealth 
of Caucasian families was $113,149 compared with 
$5,677 for African American families, a difference of 
almost $108,000. Researchers found that approxi-
mately 66% of the wealth gap between African Ameri-
cans and Caucasians was a result of racial bias, which 
causes racial inequalities in homeownership, income, 
employment, education, and inheritance.
For instance, even when African Americans gradu-
ate from college, employment inequalities persist. 
Indeed, in 2009, the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed 
that the unemployment rate for African American 
male college graduates was 8.4 percent compared to 
4.4 percent for Caucasian college graduates.32 This 
rate is due in part to racial bias. Studies show that 
African Americans seeking employment have a harder 
time obtaining employment because non-African 
American managers tend to hire more Caucasians. 
Also, African Americans with non-Caucasian-sound-
ing names received 50 percent less callbacks than 
African Americans with Caucasian sounding names. 
Thus, it is not surprising that in 2015 unemployment 
rates were 9.5% for African Americans compared to 
4.6% for Caucasians.33 Income and wealth inequality 
directly affect access to health care by minorities and 
the economically disadvantaged because health care is 
delivered based on ability to pay. 
IV. Barriers to Care in the  
Health Care System
Structural bias operates at the societal level, denying 
some groups access to the resources of society, while 
privileging other groups.34 Institutional bias operates 
through organizational structures and establishes 
‘separate and independent’ barriers through the neu-
tral denial of access to health care that results from 
the normal operations of the institutions in a society. 
While seemingly similar, there is a significant differ-
ence between structural and institutional bias. Insti-
tutional bias focuses on the direct effects of institu-
tional actions on minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged, whereas structural bias measures how 
non-class and non-race based factors, such as the 
delivery of health care, indirectly effects minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged.
a. Structural Bias
Structural bias is a result of power relationships 
between racial and socioeconomic groups, where one 
dominant group holds power over the other group 
and uses that power to secure material and social 
resources, such as income and wealth. The dominant 
group remains in power because its position in soci-
ety enables it to retain power despite the will or aims 
of the groups it has power over. In health care, an 
example of structural bias is the delivery of health care 
based on ability to pay. 
As a result of this bias, those with privilege, such 
as wealthy Caucasians, obtain the best quality health 
care available. The privileged obtain access because 
they are able to afford health insurance or pay for 
health care not covered by insurance. Those without 
privilege, such as minorities and the economically dis-
advantaged, have limited access to health care because 
they do not have health insurance or they cannot afford 
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to pay for health care.35 For instance, African Ameri-
cans and Hispanics are more likely than Caucasians 
to work in low-wage jobs that do not offer employer-
sponsored health insurance. Consequently, minori-
ties are more likely than Caucasians to be uninsured 
or underinsured, which has not changed significantly 
with the passage of the ACA.
In the first open enrollment period of the ACA (2013-
2014), the percentage rates of uninsured fell significantly 
for economically disadvantaged adults (from 35% to 
24%) and Hispanics (from 36% to 23%).36 Yet, in 2014, 
33 million people (10.4%) were still without health 
insurance. In 2014, employment-based health insurance 
covered 55.4% of the U.S. population, Medicaid covered 
19.5% of the U.S. population, Medicare covered 16% of 
the U.S. population, direct-purchase health care cov-
ered 14.6% of the U.S. population, and military health 
care covered 4.5% of the U.S. population.37 Neverthe-
less, minorities and the economically disadvantaged 
still remain uninsured at a higher rate than those who 
are privileged because of the failure of those in power in 
nineteen states to expand Medicaid coverage.
As of January 2016, Washington, D.C., and 31 states 
have expanded Medicaid to cover economically dis-
advantaged adults. However, in the 19 states that did 
not expand Medicaid, the economically disadvan-
taged remain without health insurance because their 
employer does not provide coverage, they earn too 
much to qualify for Medicaid, and they do not earn 
enough to qualify for tax credits to purchase health 
insurance on their own.38 Approximately three million 
economically disadvantaged adults remain uninsured 
because of the failure to expand Medicaid, and they 
reside in states with the largest uninsured population 
such as Texas, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. 
These adults work in part-time jobs, jobs for employ-
ers with less than 50 employees (so not covered by 
the ACA penalties), or jobs that do not provide health 
insurance like those in the agriculture and service 
industries. Because minorities are more likely than 
Caucasians to work in these jobs and live in families 
with low incomes, they disproportionately remain 
uninsured due to the failure to expand Medicaid. In 
fact, minorities make up over half of the uninsured, 
while only accounting for forty percent of the U.S. 
population.39
Even if minorities and the economically disadvan-
taged obtain health insurance, they still lack access to 
health care because they are underinsured, meaning 
they have to pay high deductibles or out of pocket for 
medical costs, which they cannot afford. According to 
a Commonwealth Fund report, in 2014 over 31 mil-
lion people were underinsured, about 23% of those 
had year-round health insurance.40 Of the underin-
sured, 44% reported forgoing care because of the cost, 
and 51% reported having problems paying medical 
bills or debts, totaling $4,000 or more. People with 
low incomes under 200 percent of the federal pov-
erty line, accounted for 61% of underinsured adults 
in the United States. By 2015, the U.S. Census Bureau 
reported that 46.7 million people (14.8%) were in 
poverty in the United States. The poverty rate has 
increased from 2007-2011, when the U.S. Census 
Bureau reported that 42.7 million people (14.3%) had 
incomes below the poverty line.41 The rate of poverty 
for African Americans was 25.8%, 23.2% for Hispan-
ics, and 11.6% for Caucasians.42
Living in poverty, minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged, who do not generally have health insur-
ance or are underinsured, are charged more for the 
health care services they receive and are increasingly 
required to pay upfront for the care they receive. How-
ever, the wealthy, who usually have health insurance, 
receive discounts on the cost of health care, negotiated 
by their insurers. Under the ACA, non-profit hospitals 
can no longer charge uninsured patients more than 
they generally bill insured patients for emergency and 
other medically necessary care.43 Unfortunately, this 
still leaves the uninsured (predominately minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged) unprotected 
because the policy does not apply to for-profit hospi-
tals, which account for up to 40% of all hospitals in 
the United States. 
Additionally, the ACA does not equalize the care 
provided minorities or the economically disadvan-
taged when compared to the wealthy. A 2012 New 
York Times article noted that affluent patients, who 
pay in cash, can stay in elite hospital wings that offer 
marble baths, butler service, and bed linens by “Frette, 
Italian purveyors of high-thread-count sheets [sold] 
to popes and princes.”44 Yet, the article noted that 
one patient who could not afford the elite rooms was 
left in pain, on a gurney, without a bedpan. Nothing 
in the ACA mandates equal quality care be provided 
to those receiving health care services from the same 
health care provider. Institutional bias also prevents 
access to health care for the economically disadvan-
taged and minorities, because health care institutions 
are allowed to decide what hospitals to close and who 
qualifies for charity care. 
b. Institutional Bias
Examples of institutional bias within the health care 
system include hospital closures in minority neigh-
borhoods and lawsuits against the economically dis-
advantaged for unpaid care; both further limit access 
to health care. Not all actions by an institution that 
disproportionately affect minorities and the economi-
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cally disadvantaged are biased. In order to constitute 
institutional bias, the action must reinforce the racial 
and/or class hierarchy and impose substantial harm 
on minorities and the economically disadvantaged. 
Once this occurs, then the institution’s actions consti-
tute institutional bias even if the actions are seemingly 
neutral.
Shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, hospitals in African American communities 
closed and relocated to affluent Caucasian neighbor-
hoods.45 In 1992, a report of 190 urban community 
hospitals between 1980 and 1987 found that the per-
centage of African American residents in the neigh-
borhood was the most significant factor in hospital 
closures.46 In 2006, Alan Sager reported that as the 
African American population in a neighborhood 
increased, the closure and relocation of hospital ser-
vices increased for every period between 1980 to 2003, 
except between 1990 and 1997.47 Hence, research 
shows that as the percentage of African American resi-
dents increased in the neighborhood, hospital closures 
increased. 
In fact, Dr. Sager has shown that 45% of hospitals 
open in 1970 had closed by 2010, and of these hospi-
tals 60% were in neighborhoods that were predomi-
nately African American.48 St. Louis and Detroit are 
poignant examples of hospital closures linked to race. 
St. Louis had 18 hospitals in predominately African 
American neighborhoods. By 2010, all but one had 
closed. In 1960, Detroit had 42 hospitals open in 
predominately African American neighborhoods; by 
2010 only four were open. This reduction of hospital 
beds in African American communities, which gener-
ally have the greatest need for care, further compro-
mises African Americans’ health by decreasing their 
access to health care.49 
As hospitals leave predominately African American 
neighborhoods, the remaining hospitals are left to 
fill the void. This often strains the remaining hospi-
tals’ resources and their ability to provide quality care. 
Consequently, the hospitals that do remain to provide 
care to African Americans gradually deteriorate and 
provide substandard care. Not only is access to health 
care diminished because of a reduction of hospital 
services, but care also suffers because of physician 
departures. Once a hospital has closed or relocated, 
the physicians practicing in the area often follow the 
hospital to more affluent neighborhoods, thereby fur-
ther disrupting access to health care services in pre-
dominately African American neighborhoods. Evi-
dence shows that primary care physicians often leave 
after the closure of a neighborhood hospital because 
the hospital provides a critical base for their practice. 
This disruption in care is significant because many 
predominately African American neighborhoods 
already suffer from physician shortages prior to hos-
pital closures and physician flight.50 As the number of 
primary care physicians decreases, African Americans 
are forced to seek care in emergency rooms and public 
hospitals, which are often understaffed and not ade-
quately maintained. Thus, the institutional decision 
to close hospitals in predominately African American 
neighborhoods substantially harms African Ameri-
cans and reinforces the racial hierarchy that African 
American lives do not matter.
In addition to the lack of health care services avail-
able in minority neighborhoods, some non-profit hos-
pitals erect barriers to care for the economically dis-
advantaged by suing them for unpaid medical bills. 
These practices have continued even after the passage 
of the ACA, which tried to limit these aggressive collec-
tion practices. Numerous nonprofit hospitals in Ohio, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, and 
Texas, have sued patients for unpaid bills even though 
many of the patients are economically disadvantaged 
and could qualify for charity care, which would dis-
charge their bills. 
For example, in North Carolina, non-profit hospi-
tals have filed more than 40,000 collection lawsuits 
in a five-year period. Carolina HealthCare system, a 
health care system that manages two non-profit hos-
pitals Moses Cone Health System and Wilkes Regional 
Center, has filed over 12,000 lawsuits in a five-year 
period, while having over $150 million in annual prof-
its and enjoying $100 million in tax breaks.51 Many of 
the patients who were sued for unpaid bills were unin-
sured and economically disadvantaged. Once the hos-
pital wins the case and receives a judgment against the 
patient, it usually places a lien on the patient’s house. 
Due to the lawsuits, the economically disadvantaged 
patients cannot sell their homes, are pushed further 
below the poverty line, have their credit report scores 
decline, and forgo medical care because they are wor-
ried about future liens being placed on their homes. 
This substantially harms them and reinforces the class 
hierarchy that the lives of the economically disadvan-
taged do not matter.
Due to class and racial biases in the U.S. and struc-
tural and institutional bias within the health care sys-
tem, minorities and the economically disadvantaged 
are denied access to health care because they are unin-
sured, underinsured, or unable to pay for health care. 
As a result of forgoing health care, minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged are often more likely to 
be disabled or in poor health and vulnerable to induce-
ments to participate in clinical trials to obtain access 
to health care. 
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V. The Effect of Bias: Burdened with Disease
Due to the lack of access to health care, minorities and 
the economically disadvantaged have higher rates of 
disease and disability. Burdened with greater rates of 
disease and disability, minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged are a panacea for researchers investi-
gating medical advancements and trying to obtain 
generalizable scientific knowledge. Without meaning-
ful access to health care, minorities and the economi-
cally disadvantaged are induced into participating in 
clinical trials that may provide a benefit to society, but 
will not alleviate their increased rates of disease or dis-
ability due to bias. 
For instance, racial bias results in increased stress 
for African Americans that impairs their health status. 
Studies have shown that both U.S. born and foreign 
born African American women, who have experienced 
racial bias, were more likely to have hypertension 
or hypertension events.52 In fact, African American 
women who had experienced racial bias and had cho-
sen not to object to it were 4.4 times more likely to 
have hypertension than those who stated that they 
took action or talked to somebody. Moreover, research 
suggests that there is a higher positive correlation 
between perceived racial prejudice and increased 
cigarette and alcohol use among African Americans 
as compared to Caucasians.53 The increased stress 
from perceived racial bias also affects birth outcomes 
by increasing African Americans’ rates of infant mor-
tality.54 Finally, research has shown that experiencing 
racial bias accelerates the biological aging of African 
American men, which may lead to their lower life 
expectancy.55
In addition to the direct biological effects of racial 
bias that cause increased rates of disease and disability, 
racial bias also indirectly increases African Americans’ 
rates of disease and disability. For example, racial bias 
in the form of redlining policies that prevent racial 
integration has resulted in racial segregation of neigh-
borhoods.56 The racially segregated neighborhoods 
that are predominately African American usually have 
less economic investment, but they have more stress-
ors such as pollution, noise, overcrowded housing 
stock, and high rates of crime.57 These neighborhoods 
also have fewer resources such as places to exercise 
or play, which increases African Americans’ rates of 
disease and disability. For instance, researchers have 
found that the presence of one or more health clubs as 
well as lower crime rates were both directly associated 
with lower cardiovascular disease risk for the African 
American women in their study.58 
Furthermore, in racially segregated neighborhoods, 
“residents do not have access to healthy food due to a 
lack of supermarkets and a preponderance of conve-
nience stores and fast food restaurants as the primary 
food outlets,” all of which have been shown to lead to 
obesity, a risk factor for cancer and cardiovascular dis-
ease.59 Racial segregation also affects the place that 
African Americans receive care. In racially segregated 
neighborhoods, African Americans are more likely to 
undergo surgery in low-quality hospitals, whereas in 
areas with low degrees of racial segregation, African 
Americans and Caucasians are likely to undergo sur-
gery at low quality hospitals at the same rate. This is 
significant because among Medicare patients, most of 
the racial disparities in risk-adjusted death rates for 
major surgery are a result of the site of care.60 
The economically disadvantaged also experience 
disparities in health status because of bias related to 
poverty and their lack of health insurance. In fact, 
“[e]leven percent of the uninsured are in fair or poor 
health, compared to [five percent] of those [covered 
by private health insurance].”61 Studies also show that 
uninsured women with breast cancer are diagnosed 
Due to the lack of access to health care, minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged have higher rates of disease and disability. Burdened with 
greater rates of disease and disability, minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged are a panacea for researchers investigating medical 
advancements and trying to obtain generalizable scientific knowledge. 
Without meaningful access to health care, minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged are induced into participating in clinical trials that may 
provide a benefit to society, but will not alleviate their increased rates of 
disease or disability due to bias. 
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later during its development, when treatment is less 
effective.62 Increasing the likelihood of serious harm, 
uninsured men with hypertension are more likely to go 
without screenings and prescribed medication and to 
skip recommended doctor visits. Data from the Insti-
tute of Medicine’s (IOM Report) 2002 report, Caring 
Without Coverage: Too Little, Too Late, showed that, 
on average the uninsured only received about half the 
care that privately insured patients received, and the 
uninsured tended to wait longer and get sicker before 
seeing a doctor.63
Moreover, the uninsured are less likely to receive 
recommended preventive and primary care services, 
face significant barriers to care, and ultimately face 
worse health outcomes.64 Compared to the insured, 
a larger share of the uninsured are unable to pay 
medical bills. In addition, the uninsured report prob-
lems procuring dental care, filling a prescription due 
to cost, and accessing physician care.65 Being eco-
nomically disadvantaged and uninsured is worse for 
minorities. For example, between 2005 and 2006, 
“[t]he largest difference in doctor visits between 
insured and uninsured populations was seen among 
African-Americans and individuals of two or more 
races.”66 This racial difference in physician visits is not 
new; in 1986, for example, a national survey of the use 
of health care services found that “[e]ven after taking 
into account persons’ income, health status, age, sex, 
and whether they had one or more chronic or seri-
ous illnesses, blacks have a statistically significantly 
lower mean number of annual ambulatory [walk-in] 
visits and are less likely to have seen a physician in a 
year.”67 Left without access to health care and overbur-
dened with disease and disability, minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged are vulnerable to undue 
influence to participate in clinical trials offering access 
to health care.
VI. Undue Influence in Clinical Trials
Professor Patricia King, one of the drafters of the 
Belmont Report, noted, “[d]espite common recogni-
tion that ‘the Tuskegee Study is America’s metaphor 
for (racial) discrimination in medical research,’ there 
has been inadequate attention paid to race, either in 
the sense of negative and differential treatment or in 
terms of pervasive scientific (racial) discrimination, in 
the construction of bioethics in the United States.”68 
Specifically, neither researchers nor those who regu-
late clinical trials take into account racial and class 
biases that make the consent of minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged involuntary because of 
undue influence. Illustrative of this problem is the 
behavior of researchers in selecting research subjects. 
Researchers from health care institutions that deny 
minorities and the economically disadvantaged access 
to health care, use these same populations as subjects 
for clinical trials. The promise of access to health pre-
viously denied, unduly influences minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged to participate in clinical 
trials. Below are two examples of instances in which 
minorities and the economically disadvantaged were 
unduly influenced to participate in clinical trials in 
violation of the “respect for persons” principle.
a. Lawsuits, Patient Dumping, and Clinical Trials
Researchers who conduct clinical trials using minori-
ties and the economically disadvantaged are often 
affiliated with health care institutions that prevent 
access to health care for minorities and the economi-
cally disadvantaged. Access to care is limited by law-
suits and denials of nonemergency and/or emergency 
care. If participation in clinical trials is the only way 
minorities and the economically disadvantaged can 
gain access to health care, they are not making volun-
tary decisions to participate in clinical trials because 
they have no other choice in order to gain access to 
health care.
For example, Heartland Regional Medical Cen-
ter, a nonprofit hospital in Missouri that receives 
tax breaks in exchange for providing care to the eco-
nomically disadvantaged, has sued approximately 
6,000 patients for unpaid bills from 2009-2013, even 
though some of the patients should have qualified to 
have their bills forgiven.69 Once the hospital wins the 
case and receives a judgment against the patient, it 
usually adds 9% interest to the bill and garnishes the 
wages of the patient and the patient’s spouse collect-
ing up to 35% of their wages. The hospital has also 
taken liens out on a patient’s home to recoup the costs 
of any judgment exceeding $1,000. In 2013, the hospi-
tal made $605 million in gross revenues, $45 million 
of which was profit, yet it filed over 2,200 lawsuits for 
medical debts. Garnishments amount to 0.5% of the 
hospitals revenues. As a result of these institutionally 
biased practices, many economically disadvantaged 
patients cannot sell their homes, are pushed further 
below the poverty line, have their credit report scores 
decline, and forgo medical care because they are wor-
ried about future wage garnishments and liens being 
placed on their homes. Notwithstanding the lawsuits 
filed to collect unpaid hospital bills from the uninsured 
and economically disadvantaged, Heartland Regional 
Medical Center recruits some of these patients to par-
ticipate in the clinical trials, which offer access to free 
health care as an incentive. 
In addition to the financial barriers to care, many 
hospitals limit the treatment of economically disad-
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vantaged patients, often redirecting them to commu-
nity hospitals or clinics, while using them as research 
subjects in clinical trials. The University of Chicago 
Medical Center (Center) is a perfect example of this 
tension between limiting care to minorities and 
the economically disadvantaged, while focusing on 
expanding clinical trials using these populations. In 
2009, the Center adopted policies to redirect people, 
suffering from non-urgent injuries and illnesses, who 
lived in the neighborhoods surrounding the hospital 
to community hospitals and clinics.70 Because the hos-
pital is located in an impoverished area that is racially 
segregated, the people being redirected were dispro-
portionately economically disadvantaged minorities. 
However, when the Center needed subjects for clinical 
trials, these people were solicited for participation in 
the trials because of their proximity to the hospital.71 
Denials of access to health care occur even when 
care is required. Under the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), hospitals are 
required to provide a screening examination to deter-
mine if a person is experiencing an emergency condi-
tion or in active labor.72 If the patient is experiencing 
an emergency condition or in active labor, the hospital, 
regardless of the patient’s ability to pay, is required to 
stabilize the patient, admit the patient, or complete an 
appropriate transfer to another facility. Unfortunately, 
some hospitals violate EMTALA by denying care to 
patients based on ability to pay, but then seek to use 
these same patients in clinical trials. For instance, in 
2009, the Center tried to limit the number of inpa-
tient beds available to emergency room patients and 
failed to provide care to those with urgent care inju-
ries. Although the policies were not fully implemented 
after two physician groups voiced their concerns, the 
hospital still failed to provide care to patients with 
urgent care injuries and was fined $50,000 as a result 
of the death of a patient waiting in the emergency 
room.73 As discussed above, the Center still uses these 
people in clinical trials.
In the United States there is no mandate to treat. 
Hence, the lawsuits for unpaid care, redirecting of 
patients, and outright denials of care by health care 
institutions prevent minorities and the economi-
cally disadvantaged from accessing health care. Thus, 
when researchers from these same institutions offer 
access to health care to minorities and the economi-
cally disadvantaged if they participate in clinical trials, 
the researchers are unduly influencing these popula-
tions to participate in clinical trials because they have 
no other choice in order to access health care. This 
inducement to participate in clinical trials is a viola-
tion of the “respect for persons” principle.
b. HIV/AIDS Drug Clinical Trials
For 13 years (1988-2001), Illinois, Louisiana, Mary-
land, New York, North Carolina, Colorado, and Texas 
enrolled foster children aged 3 months to late teens 
in Phase I and II drug trials for the treatment of the 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and the Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS).74 Funded 
in part by the National Institutes of Health, the tri-
als were conducted to determine the drug toxicity 
and adverse side effects of potential HIV/AIDS drugs. 
There were a plethora of problems with the studies, 
including the failure to obtain consent for every child 
that participated, a violation of the “respect for per-
sons” principle.75 Even though children cannot give 
informed consent, the “respect for persons” principle 
requires that a parent or guardian consent to the 
child’s participation in clinical trials, except in emer-
gency settings.76
The majority of the children used for the study were 
African American or Hispanic, economically disad-
vantaged, and foster children that were wards of the 
state or without a guardian. The enrollment of chil-
dren in the HIV/AIDS drug trials was particularly 
objectionable because not only did the researchers 
fail to obtain voluntary consent, but also the children 
used in the HIV/AIDS drug studies were not even 
tested for HIV/AIDS. Thus, the states and researchers 
exposed healthy children “to risks of medical research 
and drugs that were known to have serious side effects 
in adults and for which the safety for children was 
unknown.”77 
For example, during an Illinois study of dapsone, a 
drug to prevent AIDS-related pneumonia, “research-
ers reported some children had to be taken off the drug 
because of ‘serious toxicity,’ others developed rashes, 
and the rates of death and blood toxicity were signifi-
cantly higher in children who took the medicine daily, 
rather than weekly.” The researchers noted that for the 
period of the study “at least 10 children died from a 
variety of causes, including four from blood poisoning, 
and researchers said they were unable to determine a 
safe, useful dose. They said the deaths didn’t appear 
to be ‘directly attributable’ to dapsone but nonetheless 
were ‘disturbing.’” Nevertheless, this study and oth-
ers continued even after 1990 when Azidothymidine, 
better known as AZT, was shown to be an effective 
treatment for HIV/AIDS without severe side effects. 
In addition to this use of minority and economically 
disadvantaged children in hazardous drug trials, some 
researchers failed to obtain proper consent from par-
ticipants in the trials.
There were two common practices that violated the 
informed consent laws. First, many of the researchers 
failed to obtain consent from an authorized person, 
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such as an independent advocate, for each child. For 
example, none of the 200 Illinois foster children par-
ticipating in the trials were appointed independent 
advocates even though researchers signed a docu-
ment guaranteeing “the appointment of an advocate 
for each individual ward participating in the respec-
tive medical research.”  In New York, advocates were 
only appointed to one-third of the 465 foster children 
participating in the trials, and in some instances chil-
dren between five and ten years of age were asked to 
sign consent forms once they were told of the risks and 
benefits of the trials. Second, if consent was obtained 
from an authorized person it was based on incor-
rect information. Researchers obtained blanket con-
sent for participating foster children from state wel-
fare agencies based on the premise that the research 
had minimal risks and the children would directly 
benefit from the research. In fact, government offi-
cials in Illinois and New York gave blanket consent 
and exempted themselves from the requirement of 
appointing independent advocates to provide consent 
because the researchers claimed the trials would have 
only minimal risks and the children would directly 
benefit. However, this information was clearly incor-
rect because the drugs being tested were known to 
cause serious side effects in adults, so the risk was 
more than minimal to the children, and there was no 
direct benefit to the children participating in the trials 
because they were healthy and more than likely not 
infected with HIV/AIDS.
Even though presented with overwhelming evi-
dence of the lack of consent in all these trials, OHRP 
only noted a problem with the clinical trials in New 
York. Moreover, OHRP did not investigate whether 
the consent was voluntary. Although the children were 
wards of the state with access to health care, they did 
not have access to HIV/AIDS drugs. Thus, it seems as 
if the state was unduly influenced into giving consent 
for the children’s participation in clinical trials based 
on the promises of access to these drugs. However, 
the states gave blanket consent for the use of these 
children instead of reviewing the files of each child to 
see if the child was actually infected with HIV/AIDS. 
Hence, OHRP should have noted that the consent was 
involuntary and put an end to the research studies 
immediately. 
However, as Carol Levine notes, “there has been no 
resolution of the conflict between American society’s 
failure to provide basic health care and HIV/AIDS 
prevention programs to poor communities of color—
a matter of social justice—and the potential coercive-
ness of using research participation as an entry into 
the health care system.”79 The use of these children 
was a violation of the “respect for persons” principle 
because, among other things, the researchers unduly 
influenced the states into providing consent for these 
children by promising access to health care. To ensure 
that subjects are not being unduly influenced into par-
ticipating in clinical trials, I suggest that researchers 
be required to complete a Vulnerability and Equity 
Impact Assessment (VEIA) tool, based in part on the 
Health Equity Impact Assessment (HEIA) tool. 
VII. Solution
The VEIA should be used to assess whether the pro-
posed research subjects are being unduly induced to 
participate because they lack access to health care, 
which is a violation of the “respect for persons” prin-
ciple. The VEIA requires researchers to identify the 
biases in society, including class and race, and the 
biases in the health care system, such as structural and 
institutional biases, that prevent minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged from obtaining access to 
health care, and then determine whether the biases 
bar minorities and the economically disadvantaged 
from participating in clinical trials. The completed 
tool should be posted on clinicaltrials.gov and used 
by the IRB to determine if the study has fulfilled the 
requirements of the “respect for persons” principle 
from the Common Rule. 
a. Combatting Bias 
Since the 1970s, the Health Impact Assessment (HIA) 
has been used as a tool to assess the potential effects 
of a policy on the health of a population. Although 
the HIA can determine if the policy will have impacts 
on different social groups, the process does not pro-
vide information concerning whether these differen-
tial impacts are a result of unfair and biased policies. 
Consequently, the HEIA was created to ensure that 
assessments about a policy’s impact would include an 
evaluation of fairness and equity as well as root causes 
of inequities. 
The HEIA identifies the root causes of health ineq-
uity, such as wealth, income, knowledge, and power 
imbalances. There are five purposes of a HEIA:
1.  “Help identify potential health impacts (posi-
tive or negative) of a plan, policy or program 
on vulnerable or disadvantaged groups 
within the general population. 
2.  Help develop recommendations as to what 
adjustments to the initiative might mitigate 
negative impacts as well as maximize positive 
impacts on the health of vulnerable and dis-
advantaged groups. 
3.  Embed equity across an organization’s exist-
ing and prospective decision-making models, 
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so that it becomes a core value and one crite-
rion to be weighed in all decisions. 
4  Support equity-based improvement in pro-
gram/service design: ‘How does this program 
need to be adjusted to meet the needs of spe-
cific populations?’ ‘Could this program ben-
efit some, but not others?’
5.  Raise awareness about health equity as a cat-
alyst for change throughout the organization, 
so planners and managers develop ‘stretch 
goals’: How can we include more people in 
this program, especially those often missed? 
What barriers do we have to look for? Are we 
as effective as we could be, especially those 
with the greatest and most complex health 
needs?”80
When completing a HEIA, the following five steps 
must be completed:
1. “Screening:
a.  Determine if the initiative requires a HEIA. 
If the initiative has the potential to impact 
the health of vulnerable or disadvantaged 
groups, HEIA is applicable. It is desirable 
that all initiatives be screened. 
2. Scoping: 
a.  Identify affected populations or groups and 
predict key impacts (positive or negative) on 
those groups. Consider a wide range of vulnera-
ble or disadvantaged groups to avoid overlook-
ing unexpected or unintended consequences of 
an initiative. 
3. Impact Assessment:
a.  Use available data/evidence to prospectively 
assess the impact on vulnerable or disadvan-
taged groups in relation to the broader target 
population. It is both useful and important to 
consider a broader range of evidence includ-
ing consultation findings and grey litera-
ture (including project or program reports, 
informal practice guidelines, recommended 
or promising practices). These sources of 
evidence should be weighed based on their 
strength and quality. 
b.  Where there is very limited data/evidence 
available, note the lack of evidence in the 
assessment or, where possible, implement 
other strategies to gather evidence. Strate-
gies could include conducting surveys, focus 
groups, or consultation with experts or 
members of the affected groups where time 
permits. 
4. Mitigation Strategy:
a.  Develop evidence-based recommendations 
to minimize or eliminate negative impacts 
and maximize positive impacts on vulnerable 
or disadvantaged groups. These recommen-
dations comprise your mitigation strategy. 
Uptake of these recommendations in the roll 
out of the initiative will help to ensure that 
the initiative contributes to equity and does 
not perpetuate or widen existing health dis-
parities. Where possible, recommendations 
should be informed by diverse members of 
the affected communities. 
5. Monitoring and Evaluation:
a.  Determine how the rollout of the initiative 
will be monitored to determine its impacts 
on vulnerable or disadvantaged groups in 
comparison to other subpopulations or the 
broader target population. The resulting data 
will enhance the overall evidence base for 
equity-based interventions and can be fed 
back into the planning, policy or program 
development process.”81
Once these steps have been completed, the organiza-
tion must decide whether to implement the policy. 
Similar to the steps necessary to complete a HEIA, the 
VEIA would require researchers to complete five steps 
in order to show whether consent to participation in 
clinical trials is voluntary.
b. VEIA: Measuring Voluntariness
To complete the VEIA, researchers would need to 
screen the research proposal to identify the purpose 
of the research, those affected by the condition being 
studied, the potential research subjects, and whether 
the research is a priority to the potential research sub-
jects. If the potential research subjects are minorities 
and/or the economically disadvantaged, researchers 
also need to identify the barriers to accessing health 
care for these populations and whether obtaining 
access to health care is the central reason the popu-
lations would participate in clinical trials. If it is, the 
researcher must discuss in their research proposal, 
why they feel the need to use these populations and 
how they will work to eliminate the barriers to access-
ing health care for these populations. This review can 
be incorporated into the current requirement of show-
ing that the research will add to the generalizable sci-
entific knowledge.
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In order to answer these questions, the researcher 
must engage someone from the vulnerable population 
the researcher plans to use as research subjects. Once 
this introspective review, or screening, has occurred 
and is noted in the research proposal, then the 
researcher must complete the scoping, impact assess-
ment, and mitigation strategy steps. 
To complete the scoping step, the researcher must 
answer the following questions:
1  What populations are most affected by the 
condition being studied?
2.  Even if minority and economically disad-
vantaged populations are most affected by 
the condition, are there other less vulner-
able populations that can be used for the 
research?
If minorities and/or the economically disadvantaged 
are populations most affected by the condition, then 
the researcher must assess whether the impacts on 
these populations are negative or positive. To complete 
the impact assessment, researchers must use all avail-
able data, such as empirical research studies. If there 
is limited data available, then the researcher should 
collect data by “conducting surveys, focus groups, or 
consultation with experts or members of the affected 
groups where time permits.”82 The evidence should be 
used to answer the following questions:
1. Disparities:
a.  Are there race and/or class disparities in the 
number of people who suffer the condition?
b.  Are there race and/or class disparities in 
the number of people who survive from the 
condition?
c.  What quantitative and qualitative evidence of 
disparities exists? 
d.  Which racial/ethnic groups are currently 
most advantaged and most disadvantaged by 
the issues this research seeks to address?
e.  Which socioeconomic groups are currently 
most advantaged and most disadvantaged by 
the issues this research seeks to address?
f.  Will the research exacerbate these 
disparities?83
2. Barriers to access health care:
a.  Are there barriers to accessing health care for 
minorities or the economically disadvantaged 
who are potential research subjects?
b.  If so, what are the barriers?
c.  What are the root causes of these barriers to 
care?
d.  Will the research address these barriers?
e.  Will the research exacerbate these barriers? 
3. Adverse Impact:
a.  What adverse impact or unintended conse-
quences could result from this research? 
b.  Will the impact or unintended consequences 
further limit access to health care?
c.  How could the adverse impact be prevented 
or minimized?
d.  Can the research provide a solution to 
address barriers to accessing health care? 
Using the answers from these questions, the researcher 
must provide an evidence-based determination of 
whether members of a minority group or the economi-
cally disadvantaged group should be used as research 
subjects because they will not be unduly influenced. 
If the researcher decides to use minorities and/or the 
economically disadvantaged as research subjects even 
though there is a possibility for undue influence, the 
researcher must develop a mitigation strategy that will 
minimize or eliminate continued barriers to accessing 
health care for these populations. If there is a mitiga-
tion strategy, the researcher must monitor the actual 
strategy to determine whether minorities and/or the 
economically disadvantaged actually gain access to 
health care outside of participating in clinical trials. 
Using the Common Rule, the IRB must review the 
VEIA for all proposed clinical trials using minorities 
and/or the economically disadvantaged in the United 
States to ensure the studies comply with the “respect 
for persons” principle. Specifically, the IRB would be 
responsible for reviewing the VEIA for each research 
proposal to make sure that the study was obtaining 
voluntary consent from minorities and/or the eco-
nomically disadvantaged participating in clinical tri-
als. This review must occur before the researcher sub-
mits the proposal for funding and drug approval. 
Additionally, new penalties need to be imposed if a 
researcher and/or the institution violates the “respect 
for persons” principle. Currently, OHRP just issues let-
ters and suspends researchers from federally funded 
research. Violations of these requirements should also 
result in fines, loss of federal funding, and denial of drug 
approval. Researchers that violate the requirements 
should also face criminal fines.84 Furthermore, victims 
of research conducted in violation of the “respect for 
persons” principle should be granted a private right of 
action against the institution and the researcher. 
If researchers had been required to apply the VEIA, 
many clinical trials found to violate the “respect for per-
son” principle would never have been funded. For exam-
ple, if the researchers who conducted the HIV/AIDS 
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drug studies discussed in section VI had been required 
to complete the VEIA, it would have shown that the con-
sent was not voluntary. First, the researchers would have 
been required to screen the research to identify the pur-
pose of the research, those affected by the condition being 
studied, the potential research subjects, and whether the 
research was a priority to the potential research subjects. 
Because the potential research subjects were minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged, researchers needed 
to identify the barriers to accessing health care for these 
populations and whether obtaining access to health care 
was the central reason the populations would participate 
in clinical trials. The screening stage would have shown 
that the potential to receive access to health care and 
HIV/AIDS drugs unduly influenced state child welfare 
agencies to grant consent for these children to partici-
pate in clinical trials. 
At the time of the studies, participation in clinical 
trials was the only way to obtain HIV/AIDS drugs, so 
the research would have been a priority to the chil-
dren if they were suffering from HIV/AIDS. However, 
because the children were healthy, there was no prior-
ity to participate in the clinical trial to obtain access to 
the medicine. Furthermore, there was no evidence that 
this research was a priority to healthy children in foster 
care. If the researchers were able to show that it was a 
health priority, the research would still be prohibited 
under the scoping step because there was no evidence 
during the time the clinical trials were being conducted 
that minority and economically disadvantaged children 
were the group most affected by HIV/AIDS. There-
fore, other populations should have been used. More-
over, the impact assessment would have shown that the 
research was too dangerous to conduct on this popula-
tion because the drugs had severe side effects even for 
otherwise healthy children. Extending access to health 
care to the children beyond the study would not have 
minimized this potential harm, and thus, there was no 
mitigation strategy that would make consent voluntary.
VIII. Conclusion
Due to class and racial biases in the U.S. and struc-
tural and institutional biases within the U.S. health 
care system, minorities and the economically disad-
vantaged are denied access to health care because 
they are uninsured, underinsured, or unable to pay for 
health care. These barriers to access are compounded 
by health care institutions that deny care to minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged, and then use this 
lack of access to health care as a means to influence 
these populations to participate in clinical trials. Until 
these biases are addressed minorities and the econom-
ically disadvantaged will not have access to health care 
and will continue to be unduly influenced into partici-
pating in clinical trials in violation of the “respect for 
persons” principle.
Therefore, the time has come to put an end to par-
ticipation in clinical trials without consent, in areas 
not exempted by the federal government, by requiring 
researchers to eradicate barriers to accessing health 
care if they use minorities and the economically dis-
advantaged for clinical trials. This will only happen if 
there is a way to identify and measure undue influ-
ence. Thus, the adoption of the VEIA tool to measure 
undue influence will ensure that minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged are not prevented from 
reaching their full health potential because of barriers 
to accessing health care that are only removed when 
they are needed for clinical trials. Without the tool, 
minorities and the economically disadvantaged will 
continue to be sacrificed for the needs of the powerful 
and the wealthy.
The time has come to put an end to participation in clinical trials without consent, 
in areas not exempted by the federal government, by requiring researchers 
to eradicate barriers to accessing health care if they use minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged for clinical trials. This will only happen if there is a 
way to identify and measure undue influence. Thus, the adoption of the VEIA 
tool to measure undue influence will ensure that minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged are not prevented from reaching their full health potential because 
of barriers to accessing health care that are only removed when they are needed 
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